






AI Governance Post-GDPR: 





Recent breakthroughs in the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
have initiated heated debates regarding its governance. As of today, the 
success of AI relies on machine learning – the ability of algorithms to 
learn from, and find patterns in, large amounts of data. Consequently, 
governance of AI will in practice mean policies regarding both the 
design and access to algorithms, as well as collection and usage of 
information. Regarding the latter, the European Union (EU) has put 
in place a comprehensive normative framework: the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)1,  applicable since 25 May 2018. ased 
on the discussion that took place during the School of Transnational 
Governance’s High-Level Policy Dialogue on 26 June 2018, we present 
three actionable recommendations for global and local policymakers 
coming to grasp with the questions of AI Governance:
1. Incentivise compliance-centred innovation in AI
2. Empower civil society through AI
3. Enhance the interoperability of AI-governance structures
Policy Brief authors: Maciej Kuziemski and Przemyslaw Pałka
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The opinions of the authors represent personal opinions and do not represent 
the position or opinion of the European University Institute or the School of 
Transnational Governance 
2 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2019/07 | September 2019
Background
The Rise of AI
The last decade has been a witness to significant techno-
logical advancements made possible through the devel-
opment of AI. From increasing efficiency of production 
and distribution through smart-grids2  and workers’ 
monitoring3;  to high-frequency trading of stocks4;  to 
pattern recognition in individual and social behaviour5, 
private and public actors have been able to optimise 
various processes through automation, and undertake 
new, previously impossible tasks. In addition, a range of 
AI-powered products have been developed and offered 
on the market. Those range from image- and voice-rec-
ognition tools, to digital personal assistants6,  to the first 
autonomous vehicles, including self-driving cars.7  These 
developments are by no means finished. Potentials for 
deploying AI in healthcare, finance, marketing or predic-
tive policing have only started to be explored.
The meaning of “AI” in these phenomena is different 
from the ways in which engineers and philosophers 
used to define their quest, namely that of creating com-
puters that would “perceive, reason and act”8  or “perform 
tasks that require intelligence”.9  In a much more down-
to-earth fashion, public and market actors managed to 
deploy machine learning algorithms to make sense out of 
vast amounts of data, gathered consciously, or created as 
a by-product of online operations.10  As of today, “artifi-
cial intelligence” can be equated with  “machine learning 
algorithms” paired with “big data” and implemented into 
products and services, or systems implemented in public 
bodies.11 
Governance of AI
Rapid developments triggered global and local discus-
sions about the governance of AI, followed by publica-
tions of numerous national and transnational strategies, 
and countless working groups operating today and pub-
lishing reports.12  “Governance” runs in several direc-
tions. On one hand, many governments have realised the 
potential of making their home industries more com-
petitive through development of AI-powered products 
and services. Significant amounts of funding have been 
assigned to promoting innovation in the area of AI.13 
An a(i)rms race has started. On the other hand, worries 
about potential negative effects of an (unchecked) devel-
opment of AI have been voiced. Those encompass risks 
of discrimination, exclusion, losses to privacy and indi-
vidual autonomy, as well as rise of new, incredibly pow-
erful, market actors.14 
Since AI relies on both algorithms and big data, gover-
nance of AI will encompass regulations and policies in 
both spheres. The GDPR well exemplifies that fact, pre-
senting a live “laboratory” from which lessons can be 
drawn regarding impacts of data-processing rules on the 
wider landscape of AI-governance. GDPR’s insistence on 
legality, transparency and accountability, purpose limita-
tion and data minimisation, paired with the possibility 
of significant fines being imposed, has been criticised by 
many as stifling innovation, and praised by others for 
bringing innovation back into social check. Arguably, 
both voices carry some truth. Every regulation renders 
some actions unacceptable - that is the “taming” side of 
governance. However, it becomes clear that such regula-
tion, paired with other innovation-enhancing efforts, can 
lead to a socially beneficial model of technology devel-
opment. 
1 Incentives for Compliance-Centred 
Innovation in Artificial Intelligence
Regulation undeniably makes certain types of innova-
tion harder. Insistence on using information only in cer-
tain ways, or designing algorithms with checks encoded, 
will undoubtedly make some applications more costly 
or impossible. However, historical evidence indicates 
that properly done, concrete regulation can also stimu-
late innovation in various directions.15  On one hand, it 
gives clearer instructions to engineers or developers who 
would like to create products that are consumer friendly. 
On the other, it creates new markets for regulation-com-
pliant products.
The EU has been criticised for “being third” in the AI-de-
velopment race, lagging far behind both the United States 
and China.16  The EU not only spends significantly less 
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money on development, but also creates a rigid regula-
tory environment (e.g. GDPR, consumer law, ePrivacy 
etc.), where access to data is more difficult, and cer-
tain (experimental) uses simply unlawful. These voices, 
without a doubt, carry some truth. However, two obser-
vations are due.
Firstly, the amount of money spent should not be treated 
as the measure of success. What matters to an equal 
degree is the purpose of spending, surrounding insti-
tutions of accountability, as well as those guaranteeing 
market functioning. There is much more to developing 
new and competitive products than just spending public 
funds. This said, a lot of work needs to be done in that 
direction. 
We recommend identification of key sectors, especially 
those where the market itself will not provide funding, 
and directing investment there, under clear conditions 
for rights-centred developments.
Secondly, with global awareness regarding privacy and 
surveillance rising (NSA and Cambridge Analytica scan-
dals, for example), one can reasonably assume that pri-
vacy and transparency are not just “European peculiar-
ities”, but will gradually become competitive factors in 
business and consumer markets. The advantage of Euro-
pean developers stems from the fact that by integrating 
measures for regulatory compliance in the early stages 
of product design, they might be ready to market their 
products globally, once similar requirements - either as 
a result of market forces, or regulation - emerge. To once 
again draw on the history of environmental protection, 
countries historically not known for making this value 
their prime objective (like China) are now one of the big-
gest importers (and producers) of sustainable energy and 
production solutions.17 
We recommend the identification of strategic product 
markets and requirements, involvement with other 
regulators, and providing guidance to local developers 
on what new, right-centred applications have potential 
of being desired in the foreseeable future.
This should not be confused with soft approaches like 
“ethics” - a buzzword often used to steer attention away 
from the problem, rather than fixing it. “Ethics is Europe’s 
competitive advantage” is a slogan uttered a lot in the past 
years, during several events organised in the Union. If it 
is understood as “global expectations for privacy, trans-
parency and accountability will rise, and so let us already 
now take them into account”, these words are words of 
wisdom. However, there is a risk of reading them as “we 
might produce less, and be less innovative, but at least we 
care about ethics and privacy”. The temptation to do so 
should be resisted. Moreover, one should be aware of the 
“ethics whitewashing” practice, where businesses try to 
avoid regulation by claiming that they adhere to general, 
unclear standards.
Incentives for compliance-centred innovation must be 
much more nuanced than just adopting new regulations. 
Eight billion dollars spent on compliance with GDPR18 
could have arguably been spent in more effective and 
innovative ways. The fear of being fined leads companies 
to hiring lawyers so as to ensure the GDPR compliance 
on paper. This is not innovation, and arguably this is 
hardly a rights-centred mind-set. 
We recommend that policy makers, apart from putting 
rules and regulations in place, proactively engage with 
businesses willing to develop rights-centred products, 
and incentivise them through a range of mechanisms: 
private-public certification programs, assistance 
in global trade promotion, and rewarding compli-
ance-centred innovators with liability safe havens.
Steps to be taken:
1. Create spaces for dialogue of industry and regulatory/
enforcement bodies. Try to increase the clarity of 
regulations, through creation of dos and don’ts lists. 
Remove compliance-costs for developers through 
dialogue.
2. Think of possible guarantees for goodwill developers, 
willing to invest more in rights-centred approaches. 
Adopt policies differentiating the risk of fines for 
those who try to comply and fail, vis-à-vis those who 
do not care about compliance.
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3. Create strategic task forces for various product- and 
geographical markets. Support local initiatives with a 
chance of getting competitive advantages as a result 
of adopting rights-centred approaches. 
2. Empowerment of Civil Society through 
AI
The majority of the 20th Century scientific and techno-
logical breakthroughs have been stimulated by nation 
states as a part of their defence capacity-building efforts, 
and AI is no exception. Its development until now is an 
exemplary story of the exercise of top-down power - first 
by governments, and today by a few multinational cor-
porations. Such path dependency has significant conse-
quences for future technological directions, the makeup 
of governance structures, as well as legitimacy and 
democracy. Nevertheless, by consciously acknowledging 
power asymmetries, rethinking governance structures 
and funding streams, power can be moved towards citi-
zens. This can be done in particular through: (1) incentiv-
ising citizen-oriented innovation, (2) challenging market 
dominance, and (3) opening up decision-making pro-
cesses.
A recurring finding of many AI governance gatherings 
is that the discussions about the role and use of algo-
rithms and data carry a larger load - an inquiry into the 
way humans interact with technology and each other. In 
this sense, even the most technical debates are inherently 
political and boil down to questions of power, control and 
participation. 
Over the decades of development of disruptive technol-
ogies, humanity has established regimes for the gover-
nance of power. Today, as data is becoming a function 
facilitating power, controlling it is key in understanding 
who sets the agenda and makes the decisions about the 
complex systems that govern the lives of the millions. 
The history of science and technology proves that reg-
ulating complex systems through a single act or actor 
may be divisive and result in societal resistance. Hence, a 
pluralistic approach is needed - one that would open up 
techno-scientific decision-making processes, and equip 
individuals with tools to challenge majoritarianism and 
coercion. Yet, for citizen empowerment to be effective, 
divergent values, context-specificity and existing power 
relations need to be recognised. The following three rec-
ommendations carry a promise of more inclusive AI gov-
ernance practices:
Firstly, incentivise citizen-oriented innovation. Stream-
line resources towards civil society. Organise funding 
flexibly so as to identify new types of activism and whis-
tleblowing (i.e. platforms challenged under GDPR by 
an individual, not by established CSOs).19 Examples of 
initiatives aimed at empowering the citizens are already 
with us.20  The very imbalance of power created by the 
development of technology “from the top” can potentially 
be remedied by making it available for individuals and 
civil society. However, regarding certain uses, one cannot 
hope for the market to provide these applications on its 
own motion. 
Second, challenge market dominance. Rethink compe-
tition law. A lot of AI acquisitions are happening below 
the radar of antitrust authorities, as IP or human capital 
drive attractiveness and not the market share. The role 
of data in antitrust has been widely explored, 21 but no 
serious political action has yet followed. Further, there 
is a need to enhance capacity to understand the market. 
Regulators need to be able to monitor mergers and acqui-
Incentivise compliance-centred 
innovation in AI: Well-crafted regulation 
can stimulate innovation in products 
compliant with the declared regulatory 
goals. GDPR’s focus on transparency, 
accountability and privacy-by-design 
should be treated as an opportunity to 
innovate in rights-centered products, 
rather than merely as a hurdle to 
innovation. The same can be said of other 
instruments to be potentially put in place 
to govern the development and usage of 
AI. However, for this to materialise, wise 
incentives structures, and cooperation of 
business and policymakers, are necessary.
Recommendation
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sitions. The information asymmetry can be mitigated by 
engaging with engineers and investors.
Third, open up decision-making processes. Open 
data as a tool for industry regulation. Incentivise open 
APIs. Introduce research exceptions to monitor tech-
nology development. Institutionalise citizen involvement 
through public consultations, hearings, sensing work-
shops and randomised controlled trials (RCTs).
3. Towards Interoperability of AI 
Governance Structures
“AI” is not one thing in need of the solution. Rather, 
depending on who uses it, for what purpose and in 
what context, the challenges it poses and opportunities 
it offers might be very different. Medical applications 
might require high investments, which as a society we are 
willing to bear, but also pose serious risks of misdiagnosis 
that need to be wisely tackled in advance. Systems more 
effective at suggesting to consumers what song to play 
next will probably be developed by the market, and at this 
point might need no regulation. Self-driving cars, prom-
ising incredible benefits, but also high risks for health 
and safety might require intensive tests and certification 
before deployment, while self-learning vacuum cleaners 
might not. All this is to say: there will be no one-size-fits 
all, top-down governance structure for AI. 
The GDPR is a horizontal, cross-cutting instrument 
affecting all instances of data processing, as long as the 
data contains information about the Union’s residents. 
It puts forward a minimum standard (and an ambitious 
minimum it is!), undoubtedly useful for ensuring privacy 
and accountability. 
However, it has little to say about what data should be 
used for what purposes and under what conditions. These 
questions are not questions about data processing, but 
rather belong to respective branches of law and policy: 
consumer, social security, capital markets, healthcare etc. 
These policies should be developed in mutual dialogue 
with one another. As suggested above, for example, con-
sumer authorities, privacy watchdogs and antitrust agen-
cies have a lot to teach and a lot to learn from Data Pro-
tection Supervisory Authorities. 
We recommend the creation of permanent groups 
facilitating dialogue between different regulatory 
agencies and policy-making bodies. A lot of law, regu-
lation and administrative agencies are already in place. 
We are not starting from scratch. Let us channel the 
accumulated sectorial experience into the AI-gover-
nance structures.
Consequently, it is by no means obvious that “AI gover-
nance” will have to remain a fully separate endeavour, 
specific to this technology. Granted, various questions - 
about methods for accountability, testing, explainability 
- cut across many of the possible uses and can be almost 
universally useful. 
However, sector-wise regulation of healthcare, adver-
tising, telecommunications etc. will probably remain 
sectorial, and that should be applauded. Instead of regu-
lating and governing AI that is used in capital markets or 
consumer transactions, let us continue regulating partic-
ular markets, with a realisation that AI is now part of the 
economic practice.
Empower civil society through AI: The 
implementation of the GDPR has made 
clear that granting rights to individuals 
and civil society might not be sufficient, if 
they lack the factual resources to make use 
of them. AI-powered systems, currently 
developed by either business for business, 
or by and for public actors, could also 
be developed to enhance the power of 
individuals and watchdogs. Accountability 
and transparency makes sense only if 
someone has the power to make use 
of them. For that to happen, resources 
(knowledge, manpower, financial assets) 
should be channelled towards the 
development of what we call Civic AI.
Recommendation
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We recommend down-streaming knowledge and skills 
from the general “governance of AI” debates and policy 
initiatives, to particular segments of the economy. At 
the same time, we encourage mutual dialogue of spe-
cialists from different sectors, contributing to a general 
understanding of social and policy impacts of AI.
Similarly, certain policy considerations created by AI 
are global and can benefit from transnational dialogue 
and policy efforts, while many solutions might need to 
be developed and implemented locally. Policies and per-
spectives produced as a result of deliberations about AI 
in a specific region might be useful for other regions, yet 
ultimately choices about investment and risk allocation 
should be taken in democratic, participatory processes, 
with potentially different results all around the world.
We recommend a sustained dialogue and effort that 
should be global in nature, but also focused on aspects 
which could, and potentially should, be tackled locally. 
In this way we can secure sharing of knowledge and 
experience, without imposing particular normative 
choices and sets of values on people all around the 
world.
Enhance the interoperability of 
AI-governance structures: Artificial 
intelligence is developed globally and 
locally, and cuts across all sectors of 
social life. Opportunities and challenges 
in healthcare, finance or advertising are 
distinct from one another, and might need 
case-by-case governance models. A lot 
of sectoral regulation is already in place. 
At the same time, certain characteristics 
of AI are common to all fields. A right 
balance between global and local; general 
and special; sector- and AI-specific 
regulatory forms should be maintained, 
through regulatory dialogue and day-
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